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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEUTRALITY AS THE SINGLE
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SCHOOL AID UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000)
I.

FACTS

Taxpayers Mary L. Helms, Marie L. Schneider, and Esperanza Tizol
filed a class action suit to stop the use of tax dollars that aid religious
schools.1 Marie Schneider, a life-long, committed member of the
Roman Catholic Church, objected to the government providing benefits
to her parish school. 2 She believed government aid had a chilling effect
on the religious mission of schools run by her church. 3 The case's
namesake, Mary Helms, was a public school activist, former school board
member, and mother of a high school student. 4 Esperanza Tizol was a
mother of two children who attended public school. 5 They brought suit
against the Louisiana State Board of Education and the Jefferson Parish
School District alleging that Chapter 2 of the Educational Consolidation
and Improvement Act (ECIA) violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. 6
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act
grants federal education funds to state governments. 7 The states direct
the funds to local school districts, which then give the money to local
schools. 8 Both private and publicschools are eligible for Chapter 2 aid. 9
The number of students enrolled in a school determines the amount of
aid it should receive.1 0 Chapter 2 aid may be used "for the acquisition
and use of instructional and educational materials, including library
services and materials (including media materials), assessments, reference
1. Brief for Respondents at 21a, Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (No. 98-1648).
2. Id. Marie Schneider was a mother of six and had been a member of the Catholic Church for
about 36 years. Id. She sent her children to several different Catholic schools. Id. She was also
extremely active in educational issues, serving on various school related committees, and serving as
president of the local PTA. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.at 21a-22a.
5. Id.at21a.
6. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 2536-37 (2000).
7. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7312, 7351-7373, 7331-7332 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Prior to 1994,
Chapter 2 was codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2911-7296 (1988). Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2537 n.l. Congress
changed the types of material and equipment available under Chapter 2. Id. at 2538 n.2. The Court
did not discuss the effects of the changes because the record closed in 1989. Id.
8. Id. at 2537.
9. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7312(a), 7372(a)(1).
10. Id.§ 7372(a)(1).
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materials, computer software and hardware for instructional use, and
other curricular materials."'"
Chapter 2 imposes restrictions on the use of funds by private
schools.12 First, the "services, materials, and equipment" that a private
school seeks to acquire under Chapter 2 must be "secular, neutral, and
nonideological" in nature. 13 Second, a private school may not gain title
to the Chapter 2 materials. 14 The local school districts remain in control
of the materials and lend them to private schools.15
Specifically at issue in Mitchell v. Helms1 6 was the Chapter 2 program as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. 17 Jefferson Parish, on the
average, used about thirty percent of its Chapter 2 funds to purchase
educational materials for the over forty private schools in its jurisdiction. 18 The overwhelming majority of private schools in Jefferson
Parish are religiously affiliated. 19
In 1990, a federal district court, on a summary judgment motion,
found Chapter 2 to be unconstitutional. 20 Chief Judge Heebe concluded
that the program had the effect of advancing religion because it gave aid
21
to religious schools that were "pervasively sectarian."
However, seven years later, after Chief Judge Heebe retired, Chief
Judge Livaudais reversed former Chief Judge Heebe while ruling on post
judgment motions. 2 2 Judge Livaudais justified the reversal by citing
23
recent developments in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
11. Id. § 7351(b)(2).
12. Id. § 7372(a)(1).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 7372(c)(1).
15. Id.
16. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
17. Id. at 2536-37. Jefferson Parish is an area of suburban New Orleans, with a population of approximately 500,000 people. See Key to the City, at http://www.usacitiesonline.com (last visited Jan.
23, 2001).
18. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2538. In 1986-1987, Jefferson Parish spent 44% of the money budgeted for private schools on library and media material and 48% on instructional equipment. Id. The
equipment and material purchased included library books, computers, computer software, slide projectors, overhead projectors, television sets, tape recorders, VCRs, projection screens, lab equipment,
maps, globes, filmstrips, slides, and cassette recordings. Id. at 2537-38.
19. Id. Of the 46 private schools participating in the Jefferson Parish Chapter 2 program, 34
were Roman Catholic; seven were otherwise religiously affiliated; and five were not religiously
affiliated. Id.
20. Helms v. Cody, 856 F. Supp. 1102, 1121 (E.D. La. 1994).
21. Id. at 1164. "Pervasively sectarian" schools are defined as institutions with an overriding
religious mission. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2582.
22. Helms v. Cody, No. 85-5533, 1997 WL 35283, at *16 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 1997).
23. Id. (citing Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995)). In
Walker, the court held that the loan of neutral, secular equipment and material did not have the effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. 46 F.3d at 1465.

2001]

CASE COMMENT

The Fifth Circuit heard the appeal. 2 4 The court was faced with the
predicament of interpreting the Supreme Court's conflicting rulings in
Meek v. Pittenger2 5 and Wolman v. Walters2 6 on the one hand, and
Agostini v. Felton2 7 on the other. 2 8 The court determined that Agostini
only rejected the premise in Meek that "all governmental aid that
29
directly assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid."
The court stated that Agostini did not address the distinction between textbooks and other educational equipment. 3 0 Agostini only
determined that substantial aid to the educational function of a school
does not necessarily aid the overall religious mission of a school. 3 1
Agostini only instructs that the presumption of unconstitutionality
regarding the issuance of education materials to religious schools should
32
not be applied to state-paid teachers on religious school premises.
The Fifth Circuit then concluded that Meek and Wolman were still
the controlling precedents. 33 Applying Meek and Wolman, the court
34
held that Chapter 2 was unconstitutional as applied in Jefferson Parish.
The court issued a decree halting the lending of instructional and educational equipment to religious schools. 35 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 36 and the Court held that Chapter 2 was constitutional as applied
in Jefferson Parish. 37
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion
24. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998).
25. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding that a state program that loaned instructional equipment to private religious schools violated the Establishment Clause because the equipment could be diverted for
religious purposes).
26. 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding an Ohio statute that allowed religious schools to use public
money to buy instructional equipment and material unconstitutional).
27. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a New York program that sent public school teachers into
religious schools to teach remedial programs).
28. Picard, 151 F.3d at 356.
29. Id. at 373-74 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
30. Id. at 373.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 374.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The court specifically prohibited filmstrip projectors, overhead projectors, televisions,
computers, printers, phonographs, slide projectors, and library books (even pre-screened books). Id.
The lending of free textbooks was allowed. Id. A textbook was defined as "a book which a pupil is
required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class he legally attends." Id. (quoting
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 239 n.1 (1968)).
36. Mitchell v. Helms, 527 U.S. 1002 (1999).
37. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 2537 (2000).
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The Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to make the
...
."
38
First Amendment's restrictions on government applicable to the states.
A.

SEPARATIONIST THEORY:
STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The Supreme Court's first major decision involving an Establishment Clause challenge occurred in 1947 with the case Everson v. Board
of Education.3 9 In Everson, the Court found that a program busing
private school students was constitutional because it was a neutral,
general program of social benefit provided to all students. 40 The Court
analogized it to police and fire protection and stated that busing could
not be denied to some children just because they attended private
religious schools. 4 1
The Court elaborated on the minimal boundaries as to what protection and guarantees the Establishment Clause provides. 4 2 According to
the Court in Everson,
[t]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of
38. The Fourteenth Amendment was made applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
39. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Before Everson, the Court only discussed the Establishment Clause in regard to religious schools indirectly, see e.g., Vidal v. Philadelphia, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844)
(mem.); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81 (1908), or evaluated aid to religious schools under different provisions of the Constitution, see, e.g., Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374-75
(1930).
40. 330 U.S. at 17.
41. Id. at 17-18.
42. Id. at 15.
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religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and State.' 4 3
The "wall of separation" metaphor referred to by Thomas
Jefferson was often used to describe Supreme Court rulings after
Everson.44 The Supreme Court erected a "wall of separation" between
church and state by strictly interpreting the Establishment Clause. 4 5 For
thirty years after the Everson decision, the Court kept the wall "high and
impregnable." 4 6
B.

THE LEMON TEST: MAINTAINING A WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE

1. The Lemon v. Kurtzman Decision
The Supreme Court has referred to the "three main evils against
which the Establishment Clause was designed to afford protection:
'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity."' 4 7 In 1971, with the "three main evils" in mind,
the Supreme Court developed a test to determine the constitutionality of
a state law being challenged under the Establishment Clause in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.48 The Lemon test, as it has come to be known, has three
conditions that must be satisfied in order for the law to be
constitutional. 49 First, the law must have a secular purpose.50 Second,
the law's primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 5 1 Finally, the law may not create an excessive entanglement
between the government and religion. 52
The Court applied this test in Lemon and found the two state laws
being challenged unconstitutional. 53 A Rhode Island program that
supplemented the salaries of teachers instructing secular subjects in non43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J.
123, 126 (2000).
45. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 301 (1963) (striking down a state statute that
required voluntary bible readings at the beginning of each school day); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (holding that a nondenominational prayer written by school board administrators and recited
daily in public school violated the Establishment Clause); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (invalidating a public school program that permitted religious instructors to enter public schools
and instruct those students who had requested religious instruction).
46. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
47. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668 (1970)).
48. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
49. Id. at 612-13.
50. Id. at 612 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
53. Id. at 606-11.
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public schools was found unconstitutional because the program operated
to the benefit of the school's religious mission. 54 Furthermore, the
Court stated that the potential for a teacher to indoctrinate students with
religious messages was too great. 5 5 This potential danger created the
excessive entanglement that caused the Court to find the program
unconstitutional. 5 6
Also in Lemon, a Pennsylvania program that reimbursed non-public
schools for teachers' salaries and other materials used in the teaching of
secular subjects was found unconstitutional. 5 7 In addition to the excessive entanglement created by reimbursing teachers, the Court found an
additional constitutional violation because the state provided financial
aid directly to religious schools. 5 8 The Court stated that direct aid to
religious schools is always impermissible. 59
2.

The Strict Application of the Lemon Test

During the 1970s, the Supreme Court regularly struck down funding programs for religious schools.60 The Court strictly applied the
conditions set forth in the Lemon test. 6 1
In Meek v. Pittenger, the Court held a Pennsylvania program was
unconstitutional because it created an excessive entanglement between
government and religion. 62 The program provided disadvantaged
children in nonpublic schools with teachers, counselors, and instructional
materials. 6 3 Public school employees provided their services on the
premises of religious schools. 6 4 The Court ruled that the monitoring
necessary to ensure against Establishment Clause violations created an
excessive entanglement. 65
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-20 (1971).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 619.
57. Id. at 620.
58. Id. at 620-21.
59. Id. at 621-22. Direct aid is impermissible because money subsidies and grants by the government are almost always accompanied by various controls and government surveillance. Id. at 621.
The Court was particularly concerned with the government's post-audit power to evaluate the
financial records of religious organizations receiving direct aid. Id.
60. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding an Ohio program that loaned secular textbooks and standardized test scoring devices directly to nonpublic schools unconstitutional);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding a Pennsylvania program that loaned instructional
material and equipment directly to nonpublic schools unconstitutional).
61. See, e.g., Wolman, 433 U.S. at 236; Meek, 421 U.S. at 365.
62. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370.
63. Id. at 352-53, 365. Instructional materials are defined as photographs, charts, sound recordings, films, or any other printed or published material of a similar nature. Id. at 355.
64. Id. at 352-53. Public school employees conducted counseling, testing, psychological services,
speech and hearing therapy, as well as teaching and related services for gifted and remedial students.
Id. at 353.
65. Id. at 371-72. The monitoring, to which the Court referred, involved program administrators
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The Meek Court also found the allocation of instructional material
unconstitutional. 6 6 The Court stated that the direct loan of material
benefited the religious nature of the schools because the supplies would
likely be used to teach both secular and religious curricula. 6 7
In Wolman v. Walter,68 Ohio taxpayers brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute that provided aid to nonpublic schools.69
Applying the Lemon test, 70 the Court held that the loan of secular
textbooks and the use of the public school's standardized test scoring
service were constitutional. 7 1 The Court stated that this type of aid did
not create an impermissible entanglement between church and state. 72
The Court reasoned that the loaning of textbooks and standardized test
scoring devices did not create excessive entanglement because the religious school did not control the content or the result. 73 This prevented the
textbooks and scoring devices from being used as part of religious
teaching, and this restriction eliminated the need for the supervision that
would result in excessive entanglement. 74
Nevertheless, the Court also held that the purchase of materials and
equipment for use in religious schools was unconstitutional. 7 5 The Court
reasoned that materials and equipment have the inescapable effect of
advancing religious education. 76 Material and equipment advance the
religious purpose of schools because the very purpose of religious
schools is to promote an integrated secular and religious education; the
teaching process is devoted to the indoctrination of religious values and
beliefs. 7 7 The religious mission is always inextricably intertwined with
the secular educational mission. 7 8
The Supreme Court relied on Meek and Wolman when deciding
Aguilar v. Felton.79 In Aguilar, New York taxpayers brought an injunctive action to stop the grant of federal funds used to finance a program
that sent public school teachers into religious schools to teach remedial
courses. 80 Aware of previous Supreme Court rulings, the school district
ensuring that personnel remained strictly committed to nonideological teaching. Id. at 372.
66. Id. at 365.
67. Id. at 364-66.
68. 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
69. Id. at 232-33.
70. Id. at 236.
71. Id.
at 238, 241.
72. Id.at 241.
73. Id.
at 240.
74. Id. at 240-41.
75. Id. at 251.
76. Id. at 250.
77. Id. at 249-50.
78. Id. at 250.
79. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
80. Id. at 406-07. The companion to this case is Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985).
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implemented a system of monitoring that ensured the funds would not
be used to advance religious purposes. 8 1 However, the Court stated that
this system of monitoring inevitably results in excessive entanglement
between the church and state.8 2
The Court reasoned that state surveillance inevitably results in
excessive entanglement because when the state becomes enmeshed with
matters of religious significance, the freedom of religion suffers, even
when the government's purpose is secular.8 3 The continued contacts
between church and state that would be necessary to monitor teachers
create a special entanglement concern because teachers cannot be examined only one time to determine their intent to teach personal religious beliefs. 84 The continued contacts that would be necessary to ensure
teacher compliance would be enduring and excessive.8 5
C. THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE LEMON TEST
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court began to uphold government aid
programs to religious schools.86 In Mueller v. Allen,8 7 a tax deduction
for private school tuition was upheld under the Lemon test.8 8 The Court
stated that the legislature deserved great deference where tax deductions
were concerned. 89 The tax deduction at issue in Mueller was ruled constitutional because it was available to all parents, regardless of whether their
children attended a religious school.90 The channeling of aid through
individual parents reduced the Court's suspicion of Establishment Clause
violations. 9 1 The Court reasoned that the Establishment Clause was not
designed to protect against attenuated financial benefits controlled by
the private choices of individual parents. 92
The Mueller Court focused on the neutrality of the aid program
instead of the actual effect of the aid.9 3 The fact that most people who
claimed the tax deduction used it for religious schools was not constitu81. Aguilar,473 U.S. at 409. Teachers were monitored by field personnel who would "attempt to
pay at least one unannounced visit per month." Id. at 407. The field personnel reported to field
supervisors who would also pay unannounced visits to Title I classes in religious schools. Id.
82. Id. at 409.
83. Id. at 409-10. The Court stated that the freedom of religious belief of those who are not
devoted to the denomination receiving government aid suffers because the government is choosing to
help one denomination over another. Id.
84. Id. at 410.
85. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
86. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 409 (1983).
87. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
88. Id. at 409.
89. Id. at 396.
90. Id. at 401-02.
91. Id. at 399.
92. Id. at 400.
93. Id. at 401.
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tionally important because the law was facially neutral. 9 4 The Court
stated that with private school tax deductions, "we are quite far removed
from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establish95
ment Clause in the Bill of Rights."
9
6
Witters v. Washington confirmed the position that the Constitution
does not place restrictions on religious schools receiving general aid that
is provided for the benefit of all students. 9 7 A Washington State program provided grants to train and educate the blind. 9 8 An otherwise
qualified college student planning to study religion was denied the aid
because he attended a religious school. 99
The Court validated the position that direct subsidies to religious
schools were impermissible. OO Direct subsidies are similar to cash supplements, which are impermissible because they have the inescapable
effect of advancing the religious mission of a sectarian school.lOl The
Court added that even aid to parents or students, such as the lending of
textbooks, could be termed a direct subsidy and be found impermissible. 102 However, the Court held that the Washington program was
constitutional. 10 3
The Court relied on four facts in deciding the program was constitutional.10 4 First, the aid went to the college only as a result of a student's
genuinely independent and private choice to attend a religious school.105
Second, the Washington program allocated aid neutrally, without regard
to religion.1 0 6 Third, the aid did not create an incentive to attend a
94. Id. The Minnesota law at issue was facially neutral because it permitted taxpayers to deduct
certain educational expenses without regard to religion. Id. at 391. The expenses that could be deducted from the computation of the taxpayer's gross income included tuition, textbooks, and transportation
for dependents attending elementary or secondary school. Id. at 390 n. 1.
95. Id. at 400 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)). The "dangers" are that
government involvement in religion has throughout history caused the collapse of many political
systems. Id. at 399-400.
96. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
97. Id. at 489; see, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (stating that a general
governmental program such as busing cannot be denied to children just because they attend a private
religious school).
98. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
99. Id. at 483-84. Witters was "otherwise qualified" because he met the credentials for the program. Id. The credentials were (I) no vision or limited vision that constitutes or results in a substantial
handicap to employment and (2) can reasonably be expected to benefit from vocational rehabilitation
services in terms of employability. Id. at 483.
100. Id. at 487.
101. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985).
102. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977)).
103. Id. at 489.
104. Id. at 487-88.
105. Id. at 487.
106. Id.
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religious school. 0 7 Finally, the program did not provide a significant
08
amount of aid to religious schools.1
In Bowen v. Kendrick,1 0 9 the court rejected an attack on a federal
program that provided funding to public and nonpublic organizations
for counseling services and research in the area of adolescent sexual
relations.110 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that
the Court had never held that religious institutions were barred from
The
participating in government funded social welfare programs.'Il
case was significant because it marked the first time the Court explicitly
stated that actual diversion-the use of government provided secular aid
to fund religious purposes-was impermissible.112
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills,ll3 the Court upheld a government
program that provided an interpreter to a deaf student attending a
religious school.1 1 4 The Court relied on its previous decisions in Mueller
11 5
and Witters as support for the decision and did not use the Lemon test.
The Court found the aid was available to all deaf students neutrally,
without regard to the student's religion.116 Also, the Court found it
important that the aid did not create an incentive to attend a religious
school.1 1 7 The Court explained that there was not an incentive because
the parents had the choice to place their child in either a secular environment or a pervasively religious environment.' 1 8 The Court stated that the
interpreter would not add or subtract from this environment. 1 1 9 Furthermore, the schools were not the primary beneficiaries of the aid, and thus
20
the aid was constitutionally permissible.1
The Court distinguished Meek and Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball,121 from the facts in Zobrest.122 First, the Court stated that sending
an interpreter into a private school was not a direct subsidy of religious
schools, but was instead a program designed to help handicapped
107. Id. at 488.
108. Id.
109. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
110. Id. at 593.
111. Id. at 609.
112. Id. at 621-22. The Court stated that it was important, for example, to determine whether
conditions existed that would allow the use of funds for the construction of a building that would be
used for religious activities. Id. at 646 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744 (1973)).
113. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
114. Id. at 14.
115. Id. at21.
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 13.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 13-14.
121. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
122. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
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individuals.123 Second, the Court stated that interpreters, unlike teachers,
were required to follow ethical guidelines and "transmit everything that
24
is said in exactly the same way it was intended."1
In summary, the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated the Court's reluc125
tance to strictly apply the Lemon test to Establishment Clause cases.
This reluctance, coupled with the Court's failure to directly overrule the
Lemon test, created confusion among the lower courts as to when to
apply the test and when not to apply it.126
D.

OVERRULING AGUILAR: THE DISMANTLING OF THE WALL
SEPARATING CHURCH FROM STATE

Agostini v. Felton arose directly out of the Supreme Court's ruling
in Aguilar v. Felton.127

The Court's ruling in Aguilar prevented the

New York City School Board from sending public school teachers into
religious school buildings to teach remedial courses. 12 8 After the ruling,
New York schools began teaching remedial courses to religious school
students in trailers located near the schools.1 29 However, the cost of
operating the trailers was prohibitive, so New York schools filed a motion
30
for relief from the Aguilar judgment.1
The case once again found its way to the Supreme Court. 13 1 The
Court reversed Aguilar and granted relief from its earlier judgment, cit32
ing significant changes in recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence.1
123. Id.
124. Id. at 13.
125. Michaelle Greco Cacchillo, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: A Victory for
Disabled Children, A Snub for the Lemon Test, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 461 (1994).
126. Id. at 477. Justice Scalia wrote as to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys ....
The secret of the Lemon test's survival ... is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare
us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the
Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a
tomb at will ....
somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
127. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 214 (1997) (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
128. Id. at 210-11.
129. Id. at 213.
130. Id. at 203.
131. Id. at 214.
132. Id. at 237. The doctrine of stare decisis "does not prevent [the Supreme Court] from overruling a previous decision when there has been a significant change in, or subsequent development of,
our constitutional law." Id. at 236 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).
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The Court stated that the Aguilar opinion rested on four assumptions
33
that were no longer controlling.1
The first invalid assumption was that public employees working in
religious schools would introduce religion into their work. 134 This
assumption was invalidated by the Court's ruling in Zobrest. 13 5 In
Zobrest, the Court disavowed the notion that the Establishment Clause
laid down an absolute bar on the placement of public employees in
religious schools. 136 In absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court
now assumed that a public employee would dutifully follow the ethical
37
guidelines of his or her profession.1
The second invalid assumption was that public employees working
in religious schools would create a "symbolic union of church and
state." 138 This assumption was also invalidated by the Court's ruling in
Zobrest.13 9 The Court stated that a narrow reading of Zobrest would
limit its holding to the idea that interpreters did not create a "symbolic
union." 14 0 However, the Court stated there was no basis to confine
Zobrest only to interpreters, because interpreters and teachers had the
same opportunity to indoctrinate students with religion.141
The third invalid assumption was that "any and all public aid that
directly aided the educational function of religious schools impermissibly financed religious indoctrination." 142 This assumption was undermined in Witters.143 The Court stated that aid was constitutional if made
144
available neutrally without regard to the school's religious nature.
The aid is considered neutral if it is made as a result of the genuinely
5
independent and private choice of individuals. 14
The final invalid assumption was that the monitoring required to
ensure compliance with statutes would need to be so extensive that it
would create an excessive entanglement between church and state. 14 6
The Court's rulings in Zobrest and Bowen undermined the final
133. Id. at 222.
134. Id.
135. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
136. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203-04.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 222.
139. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
140. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 222.
143. See id. at 225 (citing Witters v. Washington Departmentof Services For Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986), and stating its holding that "the Establishment Clause did not bar a state from issuing a vocational tuition grant to a blind person who wished to attend a Christian college and become a pastor").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 226.
146. Id. at 222.
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assumption.147 After Zobrest, the Court no longer assumed that teachers
will inculcate religion simply because they happen to be in a religious
atmosphere.1 4 8 Therefore, excessive monitoring is not necessary to
ensure compliance.1 4 9 Furthermore, the Court argued that systems of
monitoring far more onerous than the one at issue in Agostini had been
upheld.150
In Agostini, the Court redefined the criteria used to assess whether
the aid had the impermissible effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.151 The Court applied a three-factor test in order to determine
whether a government program had that effect.1 52 Initially, the Court
looked to see if the government program resulted in governmental
indoctrination.1 5 3 The Court then investigated whether the program
defined its recipients by reference to religion.1 5 4 Finally, the Court
determined whether the program created an excessive entanglement
between church and state. 155
In conclusion, Agostini reaffirmed the general principles used to
evaluate aid under the Establishment Clause, even though the assumptions were undermined.1 56 The Court still examined whether the government acted with the purpose of inhibiting or advancing religion.157 The
Court further examined whether the aid has the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion. 158 However, the Court did redefine the criteria used
to determine whether government aid had the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion. 159
The question of whether this redefinition was limited to situations
that involved public school employees on religious school property
was left unresolved.1 6 0 The uncertainty that lingered as a result of
the Court's failure to decide the bounds of Agostini was settled in
Mitchell.161
147. Id. at 234.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. The Court cited Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988), as an example of a
more onerous monitoring system that was upheld by the Court. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 230-32.
153. Id. at 230.
154. Id. at 231.
155. Id. at 232.
156. Id. at 222. The Court modified the Lemon test by examining only the purpose and effect of
a program. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2540 (2000). However, the Court still considers
excessive entanglement under the effect prong of the test. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222.
157. Id. at 222-23.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 234 (laying out the three factors used to apply the effects test).
160. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 374 (5th Cir. 1998).
161. See generally Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
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III. ANALYSIS
Mitchell was decided by a four-justice plurality, which held that the
Jefferson Parish Chapter 2 program did not violate the Establishment
Clause because it neither resulted in religious indoctrination by the
government nor did it define its recipients by reference to religion.1 6 2
Justice Thomas wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. 163 Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate opinion concurring
in the judgment.1 64 Justice O'Connor emphasized the diversion factor.16 5 Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg. 166 Justice Souter criticized the
plurality for reducing the test of constitutionality to mere evenhanded
neutrality. 167
A.

THE PLURALITY

The Supreme Court explicitly overruled Meek and Wolman in this
decision. 16 8 The Court stated that the revised Lemon test developed in
Agostini is the precedent the courts should now follow. 169 However, the
first part of the test was not applied because Chapter 2's secular purpose
was not challenged.170 Therefore, the Court only addressed whether
Chapter 2 had the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 17 1
When addressing whether Chapter 2 had the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, the Court considered two factors from the Agostini
effect test. 17 2 The first Agostini factor is whether the aid program
defines the eligible recipients without regard to religion. 17 3 Under this
analysis the Court will consider the aid constitutional if it is provided to
a religious school "only as a result of the genuinely independent
162. Id. at 2555.
163. Id. at 2536.
164. Id.at 2556.
165. Id. at 2558.
166. Id. at 2572.
167. Id. at 2573.
168. Id. at 2555. Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined the plurality in overruling Meek and
Wolman. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2556.
169. Id. at 2540. The revised Lemon test considered two factors in its inquiry: (1)whether the
government acted with the purpose of inhibiting or advancing religion; and (2) whether the aid had the
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Id.; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997).
170. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2540.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2540-41. The Court did not consider whether the program created an excessive entanglement because neither the respondents nor the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue in previous
litigation. Id. at 2540.
173. Id.
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and private choices of individuals." 17 4 The second factor is whether
the system of aid allocation has the effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion by creating an incentive for a school to commence religious
indoctrination. 175
Applying the first factor of the Agostini effect test, the Court found
that Chapter 2 did not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion
because the program did not define its recipients by reference to
religion. 176 The Court stated that the aid in Jefferson Parish was "allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favors nor disfavors religion."1 77 The Court declared that in the case of Chapter 2 aid,
the parent and child, not the government, decided which school received
the aid.17 8
The Court stated that "[i]f aid to schools ...is neutrally available
and, before reaching or benefiting any religious school, [it] first passes
through the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens
who are free to direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not provided
any 'support of religion."" 179 In other words, the Constitution does not
require the aid to actually pass through the hands of individual
citizens. 180 In the case of Chapter 2 aid, any money that a religious
school received was the "result of genuinely independent and private
choices of individuals."1 8 1 The Court stated Chapter 2 was analogous to
the government issuing a paycheck to one of its employees knowing that
the employee would use the money to fund a religious institution. 182
174. Id. at 2541 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2540.
177. Id. at 2552. Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act (ECIA) grants
federal education funds to state governments. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7312, 7332, 7352-7373, 7331, 7351
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). The states direct the funds to local school districts, which then give the money
to local schools. Id. §§ 7311, 7312(a). Both private and public schools are eligible for Chapter 2 aid.
Id. § 7312(a). The number of students enrolled in a school determines the amount of aid it should receive. Id. § 7312(b). Chapter 2 aid may be used "for the acquisition and use of instructional and educational materials, including library services and materials (including media materials), assessments,
reference materials, computer software and hardware for instructional use, and other curricular
materials." Id. § 7351(b)(2).
178. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2541. The Court stated that it was not significant that individual students do not apply for the aid or use the material and equipment after it was provided to the school. Id.
at 2545. The respondents argued that the Chapter 2 program was unconstitutional because it awarded
the aid directly to the schools instead of the students. Id. at 2544. The respondents argued that direct
aid to religious schools was always impermissible. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2545.
181. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 571 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (quoting Witters v. Washington, 474
U.S. 481, 487 (1985))).
182. Id. While the Court stated the terms "direct" and "indirect" were arbitrary, it noted the
"special Establishment Clause dangers" when money is given to religious schools directly instead of
indirectly. Id. at 2546. The Court did not elaborate on this issue other than stating its "refusal to allow
a 'special' case to create a rule for all cases." Id. at 2546-47.
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Furthermore, the Louisiana Chapter 2 aid provided to schools did
not have impermissible content. 183 Jefferson Parish enforced the statutory requirement that the aid was "secular, neutral, and non-ideological." 184 Jefferson Parish used most of the Chapter 2 aid to purchase
computers, software, and library books.1 85 The Court stated that computers did not have preexisting content and therefore could not be
impermissible.1 86 The Court further stated that the monitoring system
prevented impermissible content from entering the library books.1 8 7
Applying the second factor of the Agostini effect inquiry, the Court
found that the Jefferson Parish program did not result in governmental
indoctrination of religion.' 8 8 The Court noted that the Jefferson Parish
School District awarded aid on a neutral basis without regard to a
school's religious affiliation, because the aid was available to both
religious and non-religious schools on an equal basis.1 89 The equitable
distribution of aid to both religious and non-religious schools did not
create an incentive to attend a religiously affiliated school.1 90
One possible problem the Court found with Jefferson Parish's
Chapter 2 program was that the procedural safeguards were inadequate
to prevent actual diversion. 19 1 The safeguards included: "(1) signed
assurances that Chapter 2 aid will only be used for secular, neutral, and
non-ideological purposes, (2) monitoring visits, and (3) the requirement
that equipment be labeled as belonging to Chapter 2."192 The Court
argued that these safeguards might guard against improper content, but
they were ineffective in preventing diversion.19 3
However, even without procedural safeguards, the Court stated that
evidence that the Chapter 2 material could be diverted for religious use
183. Id. at 2552.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2553.
186. Id. The respondents did not contend that the software purchased had an impermissible content. Id. Consequently, the respondent's impermissible content argument rested on the fact that the
equipment could be diverted for use in religious classes. Id.
187. Id. at 2555. A coordinator for the Chapter 2 program in Jefferson Parrish pre-screened the
book requests of private schools to determine whether the books contained impermissible material. Id.
188. Id. at 2553.
189. Id. at 2552-53. "Private schools receive[d] ... materials and equipment based on the per
capita number of students at each school." Id. (quoting Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46
F.3d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995)). Allocation to private schools must be equal to the expenditures for
programs in public schools. 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) & (b) (1994).
190. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2553.
191. Id. at 2553-54.
192. Id. The Court stated that monitoring was highly unlikely to prevent diversion. Id. Jefferson
Parish only inspected each private school once a year for two hours, and it warned the school of each
upcoming visit. Id. at 2554 n.15. The Court also placed little trust in the adequacy of labeling to
prevent diversion. Id. at 2554. The Court also stated that labeling associated the government with any
religious use of the equipment. Id. at 2554 n.16.
193. Id. at 2553 n.14.
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was not relevant to the constitutional analysis. 194 The Court argued that
if the aid was suitable for use in public schools because of its nonreligious content, and eligibility for the aid was determined by constitutionally permissible means, then the use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot
be attributed to the government.1 95 Indoctrination not attributable to the
government was not of constitutional concern. 196 The Court stated that
divertibility should not be the focus of the constitutional analysis, but
rather the focus should be on the neutral content of the aid. 19 7
The Court further noted that the respondents' evidence of isolated
statutory violations that occurred fifteen years ago was not constitutionally relevant. 198 The respondents had pointed to a past incident where the
Chapter 2 program allowed some religious books to be loaned to religious schools.199 The respondents pointed to this incident to show that the
procedural safeguards were insufficient. 200 However, the Court pointed
out that the situation was discovered and remedied by the proper authorities, thus proving that the safeguards worked. 20 1
In summary, the plurality extended the Agostini effect test to all
Establishment Clause cases. 20 2 In doing so, the plurality created a test
for constitutionality based on a single factor of neutrality. 20 3 Although
the plurality examined two factors when determining whether government aid had the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, it essentially
used the same test of neutrality for both questions. 2 04
B.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT

Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed with the plurality
that Agostini was the controlling case, and that Meek and Wolman should
be overruled to the extent that they were inconsistent with the Mitchell
opinion. 205 However, Justice O'Connor was disturbed by the plurality's
emphasis on neutrality as the criteria for upholding school aid pro194. Id.
195. Id. at 2547 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2548. The Court stated that content-neutral aid can be generally defined as any aid
suitable for use in a public school or in a private school. Id.
198. Id. at 2555.
199. Id. at 2554.
200. Id. at 2554.
201. Id. at 2555. The violations included the use of equipment in the theology department and the
lending of library books that contained improper religious content. Id. at 2554 n.17.
202. Id. at 2540.
203. Id. at 2543.
204. Id. The Court stated that it looks to the same set of facts showing neutrality for the first factor (advancing or inhibiting religion) and the second factor (resulting in governmental indoctrination
of religion) of the Agostini effect test. Id.
205. Id. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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grams. 20 6 Justice O'Connor was also troubled by the plurality's lack of
207
concern for divertibility.
Justice O'Connor argued that the plurality's opinion reduced the
test for constitutionality to a single factor of neutrality. 2 08 She agreed
with the plurality that neutrality was important, but Justice O'Connor
maintained that neutrality should not be the sole criteria for determining
209
whether government aid violates the Establishment Clause.
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's con210
clusion that actual diversion of governmental aid was constitutional.
According to Justice O'Connor, actual diversion is always impermissible. 2 11 She argued that aid is constitutional only if it is obtained as
a result of "genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients." 2 12 When the government provides assistance directly to the
student, that student can choose to attend a religious school, yet retain
control over whether the non-religious government aid will be applied
toward the religious education. 2 13 In that situation, the use of aid to
finance a religious activity is a true private choice. 2 14
Justice O'Connor argued that there was a difference between a
government aid program based on school enrollment and one based on
true private choice. 2 15 A program based on enrollment can be perceived
as an endorsement of the school's religious message. 2 16 However, a
program based on true private choice could not be perceived as an endorsement because of the choice of the individual. 2 17 Justice O'Connor
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2557. Justice O'Connor used a quote from Justice Thomas as evidence that the
plurality changed the test for constitutionality to a single factor. Id. at 2556-57. Justice Thomas stated:
If religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for government aid, no one
would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been
done at the behest of the government. For attribution of indoctrination is a relative question. If the government is offering assistance to recipients who provide, so to speak, a
broad range of indoctrination, the government itself is not thought responsible for any
particular indoctrination.
Id.
209. Id. at 2557.
210. Id. at 2558. Actual diversion is the use of government provided aid for the advancement of
religion. Id.
211. Id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620-21 (1988)). In Bowen, the Court declared
a government aid program constitutional on its face, but remanded the case to determine whether aid
had been used to support religious objectives. 487 U.S. at 621-22. The remand would have been
unnecessary if actual diversion was irrelevant. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2558.
212. Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986)).
213. Id. at 2559.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. Because the religious indoctrination was supported by government assistance, a reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program was government support of religion. Id.
217. Id.
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stated that a program based on enrollment was analogous to a government program subsidizing churches based on membership. 2 18 She
argued that subsidizing churches based on membership would be unconstitutional; therefore funding religious schools based on enrollment
2 19
could be unconstitutional.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that Agostini was the
controlling precedent. 2 20 She applied the three criteria from Agostini to
determine whether the Jefferson Parish program had the unconstitutional
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 2 2 1 However, Justice O'Connor
only considered whether the program resulted in government indoctrination, or defined its recipients by reference to religion, and the question
whether it created an excessive entanglement was not challenged. 22 2
Justice O'Connor found that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson
Parish, was constitutional. 2 2 3 It was based upon neutral and secular
criteria that allocated aid evenly to both religious and non-religious
schools. 22 4 The program was found to be similar to the one upheld in
Agostini.2 2 5 The evidence of actual diversion was de minimis and did
not have the effect of advancing religion. 22 6
Justice O'Connor also argued that the Meek and Wolman assumption of unconstitutionality when religious schools used government
funds to pay for materials and equipment was no longer controlling. 227
She found the fact that Chapter 2 materials and equipment, more than
textbooks, were easily divertible to religious use was not a significant
factor in the constitutional analysis. 2 2 8 Justice O'Connor noted that a
determined instructor could use any tool to teach a religious message. 22 9
In order to establish a constitutional violation, actual use of Chapter 2
funds for religious use must be shown. 230 The assumption that religious
218. Id. at 2560 (stating the special establishment clause dangers of direct money subsidies to
religious organizations).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2556.
221. Id. at 2560. The three Agostini criteria were: "(1) whether the aid results in governmental
indoctrination, (2) whether the aid program defines its recipients by reference to religion, and (3)
whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion." Id. (citing
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
222. Id. at 2560-61.
223. Id. at 2556.
224. Id. at 2561.
225. Id. at 2562.
226. Id. at 2571-72. The actual diversion included the use of equipment in the theology department and the lending of library books that contained improper religious content. Id.
227. Id. at 2563-65.
228. Id. at 2564.
229. Id. at 2565-66.
230. Id. at 2567.
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schoolteachers can abide by restrictions on the use of textbooks should
be extended to Chapter 2 material and equipment.231
C.

JUSTICE SouTER's DISSENT

Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented,
arguing that the "First Amendment's Establishment Clause prohibits
Congress . . . from making any law respecting the establishment of

religion." 23 2 Thus, Justice Souter stated that "it bars the use of public
2
funds for religious aid." 33

Justice Souter stated that there was no single test to determine
constitutionality. 2 34 "Particular factual circumstances control, and the
answer is a matter of judgment." 235 Justice Souter listed seven factors
that should be used to analyze the constitutionality of aid: (1) neutrality
in distribution, (2) neutrality in form, (3) its path from government to
religious institution, (4) divertibility to religious nurture, (5) potential
for reducing traditional expenditures of religious institutions, (6) its
relative importance to the recipient, and (7) the catch-all factor "other
things." 2

36

Justice Souter criticized the plurality for reducing the test for
constitutionality to a single factor. 23 7 In Everson and Allen, the Court
used the term "neutral" to refer to the government's position between
"aiding and handicapping" religion. 23 8 Justice Souter stated:
Government must maintain neutrality as to religion, "neutrality" being a conclusory label for the required position of
government as neither aiding religion nor impeding religious
exercise by believers. "Neutrality" was not the name of any
test to identify permissible action, and in particular, was not
synonymous with evenhandedness in conferring benefit on the
secular as well as the religious. 239
Justice Souter recognized that in Lemon, the Court began to use
"neutrality" to describe a benefit that was non-religious. 2 40 Neutrality
again took on a different definition in the 1980s when the Court began
231. Id. at 2568.
232. Id. at 2572 (Souter, J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2573.
235. Id.
236. Id. Justice Souter based these factors on criteria that were used to decide previous cases
involving government aid to religious schools. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2578.
239. Id. at 2577.
240. Id. at 2579.
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to use the word to describe evenhandedness in the method of allocating
aid to religious and non-religious beneficiaries. 2 4 1 Justice Souter acknowledged the change in definitions, but he considered neutrality as
24 2
only one of the many factors that must be analyzed.
Justice Souter argued that evenhanded neutrality alone is not a
sufficient test for constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. 243
Justice Souter wrote:
If we look no further than evenhandedness, and fail to ask what
activities the aid might support, or in fact did support, religious
schools could be blessed with government funding as massive
as expenditures made for the benefit of their public school
counterparts, and religious missions would thrive on public
money .244
Justice Souter pointed to three main lines of inquiry that have
emerged in addition to neutrality. 24 5 First, the Court has examined
whether the school was pervasively religion, and whether it was a primary
or secondary school, because these categories of schools raise special
Establishment Clause concerns. 246 Second, the Court has inquired into
the directness of the aid distribution and distribution as a result of
genuinely independent choices of individual parents. 247 Third, the Court
has evaluated other relevant characteristics of aid that it has found important such as: "its religious content; its cash form; its divertibility or
actual[ ] diversion to religious [use]; its supplantation of traditional items
of religious school expense; and its substantiality." 24 8
Pervasively sectarian schools are defined as institutions with an
overriding religious mission. 249 The teaching of religion in such schools
is the focus of the instructor. 2 50 Religious teaching at such schools
cannot be separated from education. 2 5 1 Therefore, government aid to
these schools is impermissible because it will inevitably support religious
indoctrination .252
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2581.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2581-82.
245. Id. at 2582.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. Justice Souter did not cite cases to support these characteristics, but he did state the
characteristics are found in previous Court rulings. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2583.
252. Id.
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Aid to primary and secondary schools also raises heightened
suspicion under Establishment Clause analysis. 2 53 The age and maturity
level of students in K-12 make "them highly susceptible to religious
indoctrination." 2 54 The Court recognized that older students are more
likely to be skeptical of instructors, and they are more able to separate
religious from non-religious beliefs. 255 Also, religiously affiliated universities, as opposed to primary and secondary schools, allow a great deal of
academic freedom and seek to evoke critical responses from students. 2 56
Justice Souter stated that the Court has also examined whether the
government aid is direct or indirect. 257 Direct aid raises a greater risk of
"run[ning] afoul of the ban on government's participation in religion." 2 58 Direct aid is dangerous because of the government's history
of granting aid to institutions conditioned upon the grantee submitting
to various comprehensive measures of control and surveillance. 2 59 The
measures of control and surveillance that would be necessary in order to
monitor direct aid to religious institutions would create an intimate and
enduring association between church and state. 260
Furthermore, Justice Souter stated that the Court examines the
characteristics of the aid in its determination of constitutionality. 26 1 First,
the Court has always barred aid with actual religious content. 262 Second,
"aid is invalid when circumstances would allow its diversion to religious
[use]." 26 3 Money grants have always been unconstitutional because
they are so easily diverted. 2 64 Supplies have also been suspect of being
divertible. 265
253. Id. at 2582.
254. Id. at 2583 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971)).
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)).
257. Id. at 2584.
258. Id. Justice Souter stated that aid directed at religious schools by the government has never
been constitutional. Id. Indirect aid that a religious school receives as a result of "genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients" is constitutional. Id. (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).
259. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971). The Lemon Court was particularly concerned with the government's power to inspect the financial records of religious schools. Id.
260. Id. at 621-22.
261. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2582.
262. Id. at 2584; see, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (noting that the State of
New Jersey cannot contribute funds to a sectarian institution).
263. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2585; see, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (stating that there can be no
support of activities, whatever they may be called, if those activities adopt a form that teaches or
practices religion).
264. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2585; see e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 5 (pointing out that New Jersey's
statute reimburses parents for their children's bus fares; it doesn't give the parents money before the
fares are paid).
265. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2586; see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1968)
(worrying that school authorities will have trouble distinguishing between secular and religious
textbooks).
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Third, aid that supplants expenditures of a religious school's normal budget is barred. 2 66 A benefit that flows to a religious school can be
impermissible when it frees up resources for the school to engage in
religious indoctrination. 267 Finally, substantial amounts of aid are unconstitutional. 2 6 8 Allowing the government to give substantial amounts
of aid to religious schools would frustrate the interest in separating religious functions from non-religious educational functions.269 Religious
schools integrate religious and secular education, thus giving those
institutions substantial amounts of aid necessarily results in aid to the
religious mission as a whole. 27 0
Justice Souter stated that the plurality based its opinion on three mistaken assumptions, which "underscore its sharp break with the Framers'
understanding of establishment, and this Court's consistent interpretive
course." 27 1 First, the plurality based its impermissible effect analysis on
whether an outside observer would attribute the aid as the government
supporting religion. 2 72 Second, the plurality assumed an equal amount
of aid would have an equal effect. 27 3 Justice Souter argued that aid
would have an additional effect of supporting religious teaching in addition to non-religious teaching. 27 4 Third, the plurality assumed that aid
based on enrollment "safeguard[ed] the same principals as independent,
private choices." 27 5
Justice Souter based his decision on the constitutionality of the
Chapter 2 program as applied in Jefferson Parish on several factors. 2 76
First, the Jefferson Parish program allowed actual diversion to occur in
the context of pervasively sectarian schools. 277 The equipment provided
to religious schools was not the type for use by individual students. 27 8
Second, the divertibility inherent in the Chapter 2 program was enhanced
by the Jefferson Parish scheme. 2 79 In Jefferson Parish, divertibility was
266. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2588; see, e.g., Cochran v. La. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930)
(reasoning that the school does not benefit from free textbooks provided to the children by the state).
267. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2588.
268. Id. at 2589; see, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (stating that substantial
amounts of aid lead to "substantial advancement of religious activity").
269. Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
270. Id.
271. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2591.
272. Id. at 2590.
273. Id. at 2591.
274. Id. Religious schools integrate religious and secular education; thus giving those institutions
aid necessarily results in the advancement of the school's religious mission as a whole. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 2591-97.
277. Id. at 2591. Most religious schools receiving aid in Jefferson Parish were primary and
secondary Roman Catholic schools whose mission was to teach religion. Id. at 2592-93.
278. Id. at 2592.
279. Id. A "substantial risk" of future diversion is sufficient to invalidate an aid program. Id. at
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enhanced because requests for Chapter 2 materials came from religious
school officials and parents, and not secular officials. 2 80 Additionally,
the inherent divertibility was enhanced because the precautionary features were "grossly inadequate" to halt Establishment Clause violations. 28 1 Finally, the sporadic monitoring program was ineffective. 2 82
Plus, no records of Chapter 2 materials were ever kept. 2 83 For all the
above mentioned reasons, Justice Souter dissented and declared that he
would find Chapter 2 as applied in Jefferson Parish unconstitutional. 2 84
IV. IMPACT
Public schools have long been under fire for the poor results
America's children have displayed in international testing comparisons. 2 85 These results have caused an increase over the last ten years in
the number of children enrolling in private schools.286 Private schools
offer an alternative to parents who are dissatisfied with public schools.
Many private schools happen to be religiously affiliated, and a private
school's religious affiliation often raises First Amendment issues. 28 7
Many Americans believe education is the most important issue facing the
country, and people do not want to see any children, whether in public
or private school, fall behind.288 Also, people welcome private schools as
competition to public schools. 289
The State of North Dakota has seventy-three private schools with
7,278 students. 290 North Dakota receives Chapter 2 funding and distributes material to private schools similar to the program in Mitchell.291
2594.
280. Id. at 2592
281. Id. at 2593. The Establishment Clause is violated when government aid is provided without
effective safeguards. Id. at 2594.
282. Id. at 2593. The dissent pointed out that actual diversion occurred in the library book program. Id. at 2595.
283. Id. at 2594.
284. Id. at 2597.
285. See generally Charles A. Hershberg, How Good Are Our Schools?, LIFE MAG., Sept. 1, 1999,
at 40. Only 34% of Americans believe schools are doing a good job of teaching children useful things.
Id.
286. THOMAS D. SNYDER, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, 1998, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. 12 (1999),
microformed on Doc. No. 1.310/2:426516 (U.S. Office of Educational Research and Improvement).
287. Id. at 71. Of the 27,686 private schools in the fall of 1995, 21,329 were religiously
affiliated. Id.
288. See Alec Gallup, The Gallup Organization,availableat http://www.gallup.compoll/releases/
pr001002.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2000). A poll conducted October 2, 2000, showed that education
was the issue of top concern to American voters. Id. Approximately 90% of Americans believe
education is "very" or "extremely" important. Id.
289. SNYDER, supra note 286, at 29. In 1997, 44% of Americans believed that parents should
send their children to private schools. Id.
290. EDUCATIONAL DIRECTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA 1999-2000, at B-3, microformed on Doc. No.
L903.N9 A32 (N.D. Dep't of Pub. Instruction).
291. THE BIENNIAL REPORT 1999-2000, at 7-10, microformed on Doc. No. LI86.BI5 (N.D. Dep't
of Pub. Instruction).
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This decision allows the private schools to continue to receive Chapter 2
funding. 292 In fact, a footnote in a recent North Dakota Supreme Court
case, decided shortly after the Mitchell decision, indicates that North
2 93
Dakota may follow the single factor neutrality test.
V.

CONCLUSION

Nevertheless, the plurality decision in Mitchell is not binding per se
on the circuits. 29 4 In the aftermath of Mitchell, courts have declined to
observe the plurality's decision, opting instead to follow Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. 29 5 The concurring and dissenting justices
emphasize the diversion factor as well as the neutrality test. 2 96 The
question remains whether the single factor neutrality test of the plurality
will be able to stand the test of time. 297
Allen M. Brabender*

292. See generally Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
293. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Servs., Inc., 2000 ND 166, 37, 616 N.W.2d 826, 840
n.6. The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the existence of the single factor neutrality test for
determining the constitutionality of religious school aid. Id. Family Life did not deal with public school
aid to religious schools; the case involved an appeal from a court judgment that renamed a director of
the corporate board of a non-profit religious organization. Id. 3, 616 N.W.2d at 830.
294. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990) (stating that the Supreme Court's decision on the "plain view" doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443 (1971), was not binding
because the opinion was a four-justice plurality). "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in judgements on the narrowest
grounds." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).
295. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 953 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Mitchell to be controlling). In Simmons, the Sixth Circuit found an
Ohio voucher program unconstitutional because it resulted in actual diversion of government aid to
religious schools. Id.; see, e.g., Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (M.D. Tenn. 2000)
(refusing to abandon the pervasively sectarian Establishment Clause tests).
296. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2556, 2582.
297. Id. Five out of the nine justices criticize the plurality's use of a single factor neutrality test.
Id. The election of George W. Bush as the 43rd President of the United States may play an important
role in the survival of the single factor neutrality test. Charles R. Hokanson Jr., WORLD & I, Where
Gore and Bush Stand on Education, Sept. 1, 2000, at 34. President Bush supports programs that allow
states to spend federal education money as they see fit. Id. His beliefs on private education may play
a role if and when he appoints Supreme Court Justices. Id.
* A special thank you is extended to Matt Kipp and the rest of the law review board for their
assistance and guidance through the writing process.
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